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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the causes of the relatively high numbers of women in urban areas in
Norway compared to rural areas. Edlund (2005) explains this pattern for Swedish municipalities
with a model predicting that unskilled women migrate to urban areas in response to the presence
of wealthier men, despite lower probabilities of marriage. The theory supporting the model is
investigated and found to be justified. Edlund's empirical analysis is replicated on Norwegian
municipal data for the ages 25 to 44. The analysis yields a negative effect on the sex ratio from
men's earnings, especially in the age group 35 to 44 years. Transactions within marriage,
explaining negative effect on the gender ratio from men's earnings in the model, are supported
byfinding women's lower marriage rates in municipalities with low male earnings.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012 a calendar featuring single men posing with athletic gear, on skis, bare-chested and in
hunting gear was published from Nore in Numedal. The calendar was produced in a humorous
attempt to attract women to the district, pointing to the men as potential partners for available
women.1 Are rural communities really experiencing a dearth of young women, leaving men
deserted? Across the country, rural municipalities experiencing outbound migration are working
to combat an exodus of young professionals, attempting to retain and attract both men and
women who seem to prefer living in the cities.
The Norwegian population is getting increasingly urbanized, women even more so than
men. If some municipalities have a lack of women, some municipalities must have a surplus,
what are the determinants of this differential migration between men and women?
Contrary to what one might expect, the municipality in which the men in the calendar
live, Nore og Uvdal, has a fairly equal number of men and women of marriageable age, a slight
surplus of men very close to the national average. In other municipalities however, the lack of
women is much greater. In 2008, 51 municipalities had more than 120 men per 100 women
between the ages of 25 and 34, leaving more than every sixth man in this age group single even
if all the women found a partner. These 51 municipalities are predominantly small, with an
average population of 2300. Comparing this to the average number of inhabitants in Norwegian
municipalities, 11165, indicates that this issue predominantly affects smaller municipalities. In
the urban areas themselves, there are even higher proportions of women compared to in rural
areas This thesis looks at the distribution of the sexes at the municipal level, without considering
the fact that municipalities often contain both urban and rural areas, instead looking at the
population as an indicator for urbanity.
In the paper "Sex and the City", Edlund explains the lower sex ratios in urban areas are a
result of men's higher earnings in these locations. Edlund develops a theoretical model to explain
how men's higher wages could predict lower sex ratios, and conducts an empirical analysis on
Swedish data to substantiate her claims. This thesis investigates the theoretical background and
mechanics of Edlund's model, and replicates the empirical procedure on Norwegian data.
Evidence is found which indicates that women migrate to the municipalities where men's
earnings are highest, even when controlling for factors such as women's earnings, municipal
population and centrality. Section (I) prepares the theoretical basis of the analysis of the sex ratio
by exploring the mechanism by which men's income might induce the migration of women, and
1 http://www.nationen.no/2012/01/20/aktivferie_og_fritid/ungkar/singel/kalender/forelskelse/7198925/
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how this might be tested using the model developed by Lena Edlund. Section (11) investigates the
pattern of the sex ratio and other variables of interest and applies the method used by Edlund
(2005) to test the hypothesis. Section (III) discusses the results of our regression analysis, and
evaluates alternative explanations. Section (IV) concludes.
(I) THEORYANDFINDINGSREGARDINGTHESEXRATIOANDDIFFERENTIALMIGRATION
The sex ratio and migration within countries
Sex ratio is a measure of the relative abundance of the sexes, measured as the number of males
per female by convention. This means that a sex ratio of 1.0 is a 50-50 split of men and women,
0.5 is a 33.3-66-6 distribution, and 2.0 is a 66.6-33.3 distribution. Naturally, the sex ratio is
bounded at 0 when only women are counted, and can go to infinity when there are only men.
This thesis uses the total population of a given age interval in computing the sex ratio, but
alternative measures of the sex distribution exist and are used. An alternative way of measuring
the sex ratio which is relevant to the study of the marriage market or migration is using only
unmarried men and women, or discriminating by labor force participation. By defining the sex
ratio for certain subdivisions of the population, factors which are relevant to the study of
migration such as marriage and labor force participation can be studied in more detail. The sex
ratio could also be measured by defining sex ratios for educational or ethnic groups. This text
only looks at top-level variation in the sex ratio for specific age groups, and only takes simple
average values for income measures where this is relevant, without delving into differences in
the characteristics of either gender. This grouping of the population by age, taking the sex ratio
as is from these subdivisions are justified by simplicity, as it allows us to study the variation in
the sex ratio without complicating factor such as weights in regressions, introducing extra
dimensions in our plots, or separate analyses for specific subgroups. It also allows direct
comparison of results to those of Lena Edlund (2005).
Though large deviations from an equal sex distribution is unusual in censuses of
developed countries, some variation is observed, especially within countries (UNdata 2011). The
sex ratio at birth is close to 1.06 worldwide. However, the number of male births per female is
influenced by a wide range of factors, including ambient temperature (Grech, Vassallo-Agius,
and Savona-Ventura 2000), pollution (Mocarelli et al. 2000), paternal age (Bernstein 1958) and
maternal stress (Rueness, Vatten, and Eskild 2012). In some places, such as India, China and
Sub-Saharan Africa, the sex ratio is skewed in a positive direction before and even after birth due
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to active selection in favor of males (Hvistendahl 2011), this trend has been dubbed the missing
women of Asia by Amartya Sen (1990), noting that the number of women in Asia is roughly 100
million lower than it would be had there been no sex selective abortions or infanticide. In an
economic analysis of differences in sex ratios among more mature populations however, such
factors are irrelevant.
After birth, differing physiologies cause the sex ratio to fall due to higher risks of death
due to natural causes from birth through old age for males, and a lower life expectancy in
general. In Europe and North America, the number of women is typically 4-5 percent higher than
that of men, mostly due to the longevity of women. Given equal access to nutrition and medical
treatment, women tend to outlive men by a noticeable amount, as the higher life expectancy of
women shows. Males are also more likely to die in accidents and from violent action.2 In the
western world, migration is a much larger influence on the sex ratio than sex specific abortion,
differing health issues, or tendencies to get involved in accidents and conflicts. In Norway, as
with other countries, the number of men and women moving from one region to another give rise
to virtually all the variation seen in the sex ratio within the country, other than the variation
which is due to coincidence of birth.
The sex ratio in Norway in 2012 at birth is 1.05, reflecting a natural ratio of sexes, while
the total population has a ratio of 0.98, mainly due to the longevity of women.3 As with other
countries however, the sex ratio varies greatly within the country, most notably along the rural-
urban divide. This is a demographic feature Norway shares with most western countries, some of
which exhibit dramatic differences in sex ratio between urban and rural areas. Figure 1 shows
the difference in European countries, with labels for selected countries. With the exception of
Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands, all the countries have a higher sex ratio in rural areas
than in urban, as can be seen by their placement above the diagonal indicating equal sex ratios.
The sex ratios and other variables of interest on Swedish municipalities were used by Lena
Edlund to study the determinants of the sex ratio; an analogous procedure is used in this thesis.
2 CDC, Centers for Disease Control: Death Rates for 113 Selected Causes 1999-2006.
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality/gmwk291r.htm
3 CIA World Fact book, Norway. 2012. People and Society; Sex Ratio.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html.
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Figure I, The rural and urban sex ratios of European countries.
With a relatively healthy and safe population, migration is the most likely explanation for the
difference in urban and rural areas' sex ratio from the sex ratio at birth, 1.05. As with other
countries, this migration between rural and urban areas in Norway differs with regard to the
sexes. Figure 2 shows the fraction of males in each municipality between the ages of 15 and 44
in all Norwegian municipalities, and provides an overview of how the genders are distributed
across the nation. Bear in mind that some of the smaller municipalities are the most populous.
The picture is quite muddled, and the sex ratio exhibits no clear-cut geographic trend, except for
a concentration of municipalities around Oslo with low male fractions and some municipalities
in the inland with a seemingly high male fractions. The differences we see between
municipalities can be the result of migration which differs in its gender composition, or due to
accidents of birth. The following pages look at the distribution of the sexes as measured by the
sex ratio in light of other non-geographic characteristics defining the municipalities, such as
average income, population and distances to urban centers, rather than strictly geographic
measures. This data is used to find how these variables induce men and women to locate
differently.
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Figure 2, Geographic overview of Norwegian municipalities' male fractions.
Source: Norwegian Social Science Data Services, darker areas have more men per woman than lighter areas.
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The factors motivating relocation should be central when investigating the sex ratio.
Some relocate to acquire an education, and later to acquire a source of employment. Others
might move for the possibility of employment, or the possibility of finding a suitable partner.
Some might also simply relocate due do preferences with regard to the environment, such as the
size of the city, general atmosphere, access to recreational activities, and available services.
For large portions of the population, the following pattern would likely sound plausible.
Relocation for the purpose of acquiring an education, followed by relocation for employment,
with a partner towards new employment, or `going home'. The neoclassic perspective on
migration sees individuals relocating in response to regional economic factors (Sweeney 1995),
this thesis also investigates migrants economic incentives, but includes a consideration of gender
roles. In particular, the next section investigates how the condition in the marriage market
necessitates and facilitates transactions from men to women. If education, employment and
romantic interests are important determinants in migration decisions, how do these work to
produce differences in sex ratios between Norwegian municipalities?
The marriage market
A man and a woman enter into a marriage agreement if both consent to it, meaning a marriage
must benefit both the man and the woman compared to the alternative of staying single, or
marrying someone else who is willing. The number and importance of different variables taken
into account by men and women contemplating marriage are likely highly individual and
complicated in actuality. How marriage is to be understood in an economic framework by
modeling marriage terms and choices to predict outcomes will depend on which assumptions are
taken by the model.
The theoretical study of marriage between men and women typically takes a distanced
and unromantic view of courtship, instead focusing on quantifiable factors. In economic
modeling, the pairing of men and women takes place in the marriage market, a theoretical
construct in which men and women make decisions about marriage. Men and women pick
possible partners from their local area, or relocate if no suitable and available partners are found.
The criteria for choosing partners are sex dependent due to differing needs for biological and
social reasons. Each man and woman has sufficient information about all partners to take
decisions based on priority, and can make a choice about whether or not to get married to a
particular person. Faced with a choice of partners, an individual will choose the one which
maximizes personal utility, or `happiness'. A potential partner's utility contribution to the other
party might be that he or she meets a demand for safety, financial resources, the ability to
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produce or care for children, sexual or platonic companionship, class advancement, and so on.
The utility contribution of a partner is also dependent on the marriage agreement, which can be
seen as a contract stipulating obligations and benefits for the man and the woman. How men and
women's matching decisions play out, and how this influences investments in human capital,
gender roles, transactions between partners, and migration patterns can be made subject to
economic modeling.
The following theoretical section shows why men's income might be important for the
migration decisions of women. The connection between men's earnings and women's migration
is established by first giving an outline of Lena Edlund's model, before examining the theoretical
basis of the assumptions underlying the model. First, we examine whether women are scarce in
the marriage market, and why this might be the case. Next we examine how and why women
might want to leverage their scarcity in order to extract resources from a relationship. Finally we
examine why men might pay women for marriage before moving on to the mathematical
framework established by Edlund (2005) for showing why women move to urban areas.
An important fact to point out before making statements about the marriage market is that
the motivations and conditions of men and women might be greatly variable on an individual
level, but patterns for larger groups might still be possible to identify. If a theoretical model
captures some of the truth, it might be valuable as an analytical tool even if most of the truth is
unexplained.
"Sex and the City"
Lena Edlund's article in Scandinavian journal of Economics, "Sex and the City" investigates the
sex ratios in Swedish municipalities and their determinants. The title of the article is a reference
to a popular TV series with the same name, which chronicles the personal, professional and
romantic journeys of four women in New York City. Though lauded with 50 Emmys during its
six seasons, the show was also criticized as portraying women as dependent,4 while others
celebrate its vision of independent women.5 A constant theme in the series is the romantic
exploits of the main character, Carrie Bradshaw, a sex columnist with a spending habit and
accompanying financial woes. Her financial situation generally fluctuates along with the
direction of her career and her love life. Recurring throughout the series is an on-and-off
relationship with Mr. Big, a wealthy financier who finally becomes Carries husband in the movie
following the series. Before she settles down with Mr. Big, Carrie and her friends are bothered
htt ://www.tele ra h.co.uk/culture/film/7746119/Sorr -sisters-but-I-hate-Sex-and-the-Cit .html
htt ://www. uardian.co.uk/media/2004/' an/29/broadeastin .tvandradio
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with the fact that all the `good' men in Manhattan are taken, and if a man is available, a host of
other women are there to compete for their affection.
Edlund's article points to a puzzle in the surplus of women in urban areas; if cities offer
more work opportunities for skilled workers, why don't urban areas have a surplus of men, when
they are more skilled than women? Edlund's starting point is that since women generally have
lower educational attainment, or less job specific skillsets, the relatively more skill dependent
employment opportunities of urban areas should produce cities with a surplus of men, not
women. The solution to this puzzle according to Edlund, is the migration of unskilled women to
urban areas. These unskilled women move to areas where their chances of acquiring a partner
with more financial resources are greater.
This might not seem like a puzzle at all for Sweden or Norway, where more women than
men go on to take higher education. In Norway, 61 percent of all students taking higher
education were women in 2008(Steinkellner 2010). The same pattern is seen in Sweden, where
50 percent of women and 39 percent of men take higher education (Petersson 2006). On the
other hand, even though women participate more in higher education and study for a longer
period on average, it is still the case in Norway that the majority of those completing higher
educational courses of four or more years are men (Holøien and Nygård 2010). Women are also
more `traditional' in their choices, and represent a large majority in educational courses leading
to jobs such as nursing and teaching, though the sex gap in higher technical education and longer
courses such as engineering have been closing in recent years (Hollås 2007). Without delving too
deep into why men might earn more than women, be it the work habits, level of ambition,
relevance of educational or practical skills with regard to the labor market, or competing
considerations, the fact remains that men earn more than women on average. One notable reason
is that women tend to work part time more than men, especially married women (Seitz 1999).
Edlund's puzzle might be reformulated as follows. Why do more women than men live in urban
areas, when urban areas offer relatively more jobs which demand educational attainments
predominantly held by men?
The essence of Edlund's theoretical model is that young fecund women are scarce
(Trivers and Willard 1973) and that men value traits that are associated with fecundity such as
youth and beauty (Todd et al. 2007), giving young women a choice of partners. The scarcity of
fecund women follows from the fact that men can produce children for a relatively long period,
and that women must invest more time and resources in their children. If women value financial
security when choosing a partner, richer men will face better availability of partners. If these
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selection patterns exist, one would expect to see young women marrying rich men. If marriage
and employment constitute separate sources of earnings for young fecund women, and rich men
are predominantly located in urban areas, this might account for the lower sex ratios in these
areas.
But why don't less well-off men follow these young women to the urban areas in hopes
of more favorable marriage market opportunities, balancing out the sex ratio? One possibility is
the way the differential fecundity affects gender roles and the way marriage and work interact.
For men, employment is more often a requirement for marriage opportunities, while marriage
and employment might constitute separate sources of earnings for women. Fecund women can
bargain for financial resources in exchange for marriage, while men gain employment in order to
attract women at a later date. There is some support for this proposition in that men are of a
higher average age at first marriage than women, indicating some time is required to attain
sufficient resources to attract a mate. This pattern for average age at first marriage is observed all
over the world (Bergstrom and Bagnoli 1993). If men must attain sufficient wages of capital to
attract mates, areas with higher wages may support a surplus of women, because women can
attain resources both through marriage and employment. An indication of transactions in a
marriage framework is the fact that married women participate less in the workforce than single
women, indicating that marriage can constitute an alternate income source (Miller 1993). That
doesn't necessarily mean that married women are less active than unmarried women however,
since they more often are occupied with home production, such as taking care of children and do
more households chores and so on.
Edlund's paper states that there is a pattern to explain, the lower sex ratio in urban areas,
and that the mechanism of action is rich men's transfers to women in these areas, which allow
for more women. The model thus hinges on the assumption that men actually pay women, a
fairly controversial proposition. Despite this, there is some theoretical and empirical support for
asserting that transfers take place from men to women both in marriages and outside of them. We
first discuss why men might pay women by investigating the relative scarcity and investments of
the sexes when initiating relationships and how this affects their motivations, and then how such
transfers can be facilitated by marriage before explaining and discussing Edlund's mathematical
model and other evidence on gender-specific migration.
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Women's scarcity
There are some important differences between men and women which ultimately affect their
decisions when choosing partners. Both men and women might become fertile many years before
the desire and opportunity to have and care for a child emerges. Most men however, are able to
produce children well into old age, while women stop being fertile at menopause, making their
window of opportunity smaller. In practice, women's window of fertility is even smaller because
they are at their most fertile in their teens and early twenties, after which fertility declines, and
the chance of complications such as spontaneous abortions or birth defects increases. The
relatively unequal fertility `windows', and the fact that most men and women want to have
children at some point in their lives, leads to a condition called differential fecundity (Hoperoft
2005). Men who are looking for a partner engage in competition for relatively scarce resource,
young fecund women. Even though men might not be looking for mating opportunities with the
express purpose of producing children, evolutionary biology has resulted is strong sexual
selection for markers of health and fertility, such as youth and beauty. Women who possess such
traits (predominantly the younger women) can in turn choose the most desirable mate among a
larger pool of potential partners, leveraging their fecundity in order to attract the most desirable
partner.
The importance of scarcity in the marriage market is illustrated by a study of France after
the First World War, when the scarcity of men increased dramatically. When large shares of the
men in marriageable age were killed, those men who survived faced a marriage market where the
sex ratio was substantially decreased, down to 0.86 in some regions, meaning women were
relatively plentiful. In general, men married women of higher standing than before, while lower-
class women stayed single more often (Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos 2011).
Surviving men after the war were able to leverage their increased scarcity to improve their
position in the marriage market. If men are able to `marry up' more often when their numbers
decrease, the same should also be true for women. Because an undeniably valuable asset in the
marriage market is the youth that a woman possesses for a limited time period, women of this
age are in high demand among a larger group of men. If women value financial security, as
argued in the next section, richer men should have better prospects in the marriage market.
In the monogamous framework of traditional marriage, some of the differential fecundity
of the sexes is eliminated due to the husband only mating with one woman. In a completely
sexually liberated society, with free mating opportunities for both sexes, the reproductive
capacity is effectively limited only by the availability of women. Known as female dominance
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(with regard to the number of each sex), this phenomenon is seen in certain species where few
men can supply the reproductive needs of large populations. In tribes of the Hamadryas baboon
(Papio hamadryas), the number of women per sexually active male is often four or more, these
must be guarded closely by the dominant male (Schreier and Swedell 2009). In societies with
monogamous relationship such as marriage however, reproduction is limited by the sex in
shortest supply, this is known as marriage squeeze (Johansen and Dagsvik 1999; Glick 1988) .
Preferences for age, education and so on may contribute to marriage squeeze, and this
phenomenon is not uncommon, even though the sex ratio within areas delimiting the marriage
markets rarely deviates very far from unity. Because of the relatively stable sex ratio,
monogamous marriage tends to even out the differences in differential fecundity by limiting the
mating opportunities for men. Remarriage is common after divorce or the death of a partner and
as long as there is some remarriage, young women will be scarce. Even in the framework of
monogamy, remarriage increases the scarcity of fecund women because men are more likely to
remarry than women are. In the mid-1970's, men were more likely to remarry than women in all
but three European countries, Austria, England and Wales (Chamie and Nsuly 1981). The
reasons for this difference between men and women might be due to societal acceptance of
men's remarriage versus women's or differences in economic prospects following a divorce.
Women are also often left with most or full custody, which further lowers their economic
prospects and attractiveness in the marriage market (Sweeney 1995). Even though the reasons
might be complicated, the fact remains that remarriage is more common among men than women
in Norway,6 making women more scarce, and the competition among men tougher than if there
was an equal remarriage rate.
Why women might want more wealthy men
In an analysis of the interaction between the marriage and labor market, Aloysius Siow (1998)
investigated how differential fecundity and remarriage affected gender roles through
participation in the labor market. Women in societies where the gender ratio is near unity are
scarce because of differential remarriage rates and women's relatively short period of fertility.
For this reason, men and women face different condition when choosing how to allocate their
time between accumulating human capital in the labor market, and spending time with children.
Siow finds that men have an incentive to accumulate more human capital. This is because in the
case of a divorce, men will need to compete with younger men for the favor of young women.
6 Statistics Norway, Statistical Yearbook 2011, table 96: htt ://www.ssb.no/aarbok/tab/tab-096.html
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When participating in this competition, older men utilize their accumulated human capital to
compensate for the age differential (Vella and Collins 1990). Women face different conditions in
the marriage market than men, they do not have the same incentive for building up future human
capital, and will instead choose to spend more time raising children and consuming goods
provided in part by the husband. Women are able to do this because they have a relatively large
selection of men to choose from, and will choose the man with the higher available human
capital, which translates into income in Siow's model.
Another important difference between men and women is the amount of resources each
party invests in a child; as a rule, women invest more in their children than men (Bethmann and
Kvasnicka 2007; Buss 2005). Beginning at conception, women sacrifice resources for the
nourishment of the child throughout pregnancy, and are in most societies the default caretaker of
the child from birth until the child is self-sufficient. Children are therefore both a time
consuming and financially burdening commodity for women, while the benefit of children goes
to both parents. Children confer both psychological rewards and costs (Nomaguchi and Milkie
2003), but are clearly desired, as evidenced by the reproduction even of couples who have
control over their reproductive health. The protracted period of investment required from the
mother as opposed to the father (whose minimal contribution can be counted in minutes),
establishes an imbalance from the outset in the investments faced by men and women.
Women face a relatively large required investment of time and resources. Fecund
women's opportunity of picking and choosing the most desirable mate gives them the incentive
and possibility to choose the man with the most available resources, for the convenience and
safety of both themselves and their children. Indeed, from the study of marriages there is
evidence that men's economic prospects are positively related to his marriage prospects: a wide
range of studies have shown that unemployment or low earnings decrease the probability of
getting married, and increase the possibility of divorce (Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, and Nelson Lim
1997; Sweeney 2002; Blossfeld 2005).
Why men pay women for marriage
As discussed, women are fecund for a shorter period of time than men, making them in demand
across a relatively large group of men compared to their own availability. This goes at the
expense of their ability to attract a mate at a later date due biologically dictated factors of
attraction and is also a result of the larger potential time costs of initiating a relationship for
women. Women invest more greatly in their children than men, both by nature, choice, and due
to societal factors. Because of this differential investment of time and resources, the benefit of
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attracting additional partners is slight for women, while men can reproduce greatly without much
required investment. While men reap all the reward of having children, and can have a large
number of them if the opportunity to do so arises, women must factor in more of the costs
associated with rearing children and can have a smaller total number of children. If marriage is a
constraint on access to reproductive opportunities or a prerequisite for having children, men
should have a higher willingness to pay for marriage due to their larger difference in benefit and
costs associated with children. This creates grounds for competition among males for women on
the income dimension. The differential fecundity involves a time constraint for women, but
introduces some leverage in the negotiation of resources for women who have this fecundity,
because women are the bottlenecks of reproduction (Campbell and Trivers 1973). Put simply,
women must choose carefully who they initiate a relationship with, while men will try to reach
as many women as they can (Symons 1981). Therefore, men generally reproduce according to
their ability to attract partners, while women are much less constrained (Bateman 1948). The
difference in reward for the acquisition of an additional partner creates a competition among men
for the affection of women which is more intense than that among women competing for the
affection of men if the sex ratios is near unity. With this in mind, it makes sense that men should
pay women.
Transactions in the marriage framework
Marriage can be understood as a contract where men agree to transfer resources to the women in
exchange for custodial rights, as a transfer in response to more intense competition for the favor
of women. It can also be understood as an institutional framework within which children are
produced. The custody rights typically fall to the mother if out of wedlock, but half the custodial
rights fall to the husband if the child is conceived within a marriage, where paternity is typically
more certain. Men value time with their children as well, and might be willing to transfer
resources in order to attain part custody and the default assumption of paternity. If men can be
thought to pay for rights to marriage and custodial rights, we should expect to see some evidence
for this. Concrete evidence is given by societies where the practice of bride price is or was
common, such as in traditional Chinese and Indian societies, and parts of Africa. In western
societies, transfers from the man to the woman are not normally explicitly agreed upon, nor do
they happen before the marriage, but rather throughout the marriage to both the wife and child,
as transfers of wealth to a common spending pool, or as the shared consumption of goods paid
for by men more than by women. While it is true that women often consume less than half of the
potential goods and services purchased in a household, this within-household consumption
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inequality is decreasing (Lise and Seitz 2011). Men's investment in children can be seen as a
transfer from men to women. When men spend money on children (a common good), they
alleviate the financial situation for women compared to her financial situation out of marriage, as
women would often be the default caretaker.
Differential migration: Edlund's model
A summary of the elements underpinning the mathematical model is in place before moving on
to the mathematical presentation. The fact that young fertile women are scarce in the marriage
market gives them leverage when negotiating in the marriage market. With a relatively large
investment in children, she has the incentive to use this opportunity to extract financial resources
from a marriage. Men are willing to accept this because they also value marriage, and participate
in more intense competition for fecund women. If men pay women for marriage, wealthier men
can afford larger transaction to women, giving women an incentive to relocate if such men are
unevenly distributed.
In order to model the effects of differing skill levels and resulting wages on the migration
decisions of men and women, a model with certain simplifying assumptions was constructed by
Edlund, and is presented here to show how differing skills between men and women and the
concentration of skilled jobs in urban areas makes possible the lower sex ratios in these areas.
The model is an elaboration on the Harris-Todaro model, which seeks to explain workers
in agricultural areas migrate to the city, even though they are more likely to end up unemployed
(Harris and Todaro 1970). With risk-neutral workers, higher unemployment can be expected in
urban area so long as urban wages are higher than agricultural wages. With a given urban
population, lus, and a smaller number of urban jobs equal to the number of urban workers, 1e, the
probability of finding a job in an urban area is 1,/1us• If the wages in rural agricultural areas are
1417-,and the wages in the urban area are wu, migration from the rural agricultural areas to the
urban areas will occur so long as wr < (tefius )wu or opposite if W > (1,/1„ )wu until an
equilibrium is found at equality. In other words, the higher wages make up for the higher
probability of unemployment.
In Edlund's model, higher expected transfers in marriage due to the presence of wealthier
men make up for the higher probability of not getting married (due to a larger proportion of
women) for rural unskilled women moving to the urban area. The Harris-Todaro model assumes
random matching between jobs and workers, while Edlund's model assumes random matching
with priority given to wealthy men in the marriage market. Harris and Todaro also assume
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invariant wages which are exogenously determined, while transfers from men to women in
Edlund's model are determined by the location and skills of the man, with high-paying jobs only
available in the urban areas. Edlund's model further assumes infinitely elastic labor demand, as
opposed to an invariant number of jobs. Rather, it is the endogenous probabilities of different
wage dependent transfer from men to women which varies, determined by the invariant number
of high-skilled men in urban areas compared to the varying number of women. As explained
later, it is the location choices of unskilled rural women which finally determines the sex ratio in
rural and urban areas, and which is analogous to the Harris-Todaro model. In making this choice,
rural unskilled women consider the transfers from men as an additional source of income,
effectively increasing the number of women that an urban area can support, which we remember
was the solution to the puzzle posited by Edlund.
Consider a population with an equal number of M men and F women. There are two
types within each sex, those who are unskilled ML and FL,for men and women respectively, and
those who are skilled, MH and FH. Skill is a measure of job-related competence, and indicates
what productivity an employee achieves in the workforce, and which kinds of jobs a person can
take. A higher fraction of men are assumed to be skilled than women, so MH > FH. As a
consequence, there are more unskilled women than men, FL > ML. There are only two kinds of
jobs, unskilled jobs which pay wL, and skilled jobs which pay WH.Skilled jobs pay more than
unskilled jobs, Wif > WL. Because high-skilled jobs are those with high wages, and unskilled jobs
are those with low wages, the terms skilled/unskilled, high-paying/low-paying and high-
wage/low-wage are used interchangeably. Those who are skilled can take both kinds of jobs,
while those who are unskilled can only be employed in unskilled low-paying jobs.
The population in our model is born into two areas, Rural and Urban; denoted with
superscripts R and U. Unskilled jobs are available in both locations, while skilled jobs may only
be obtained in Urban. All inhabitants can choose freely where they want to locate themselves.
The initial population in Rural is rnR men and fRwomen, while the population in Urban
is mu men and fu women. Initial sex ratios are balanced in both locations, meaning that there's
an equal number of men and women in both Urban and Rural, m R/fR = /fU = 1.
Men and women change locations if they believe they can achieve a higher expected
payoff in the other location. Changing locations means entering a different job market and
marriage market, these markets are local, meaning no one can live in one place, and have a
partner or a job in another. Let Gj' indicate the number of a certain sex G=(M, F) in a location
i=(U, R), of a certain type j=(L, II).
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In the marriage market, all women are assumed to be identical. This means that men
show no preference with regards to the women's skills or jobs. Furthermore, men pay women for
marriage, which is assumed to be a normal good. Normal goods are goods for which demand
increases with wealth if price stays constant, meaning more wealthy men are more willing to pay
for marriage than less wealthy men. Men's valuation of marriage, z, is therefore dependent on his
earnings. Men with high wages thus pay more for marriage than men in unskilled jobs; z(WH) >
z(14'11)> 0.
Some assumptions apply to the payment of women for marriage. First, relationships are
strictly monogamous, and there is no time dimension, so divorces do not happen. Secondly, men
in low-paying jobs pay their valuation of marriage, zL=z(yL), this means unskilled men or high-
skilled men in unskilled jobs are indifferent with regards to marriage. Lastly, men in skilled jobs
do not pay their full valuation, but they pay more than men in low-skilled jobs, z H E
(z (141L), z (141H)]
Random matching with priority rankings in the marriage market is assumed, and the short
side always marries. This means that with a surplus of women, all men get married because they
are the short side, and vice versa. Priority matching means that high wage men marry before
those with low wages. With more high wage men than women in a location i, high wage men
marry with probability min {1, F11 where F is the number of women in that location, and
Mk is the number of skilled men. If the number of women is greater than the number of skilled
men, all skilled men marry. Unskilled men in the areas where the number of women is greater
than the number of skilled men marry with probability min 11,Fi —MjI/M11},where Fi —111j1
is the number of women who didn't get married to a skilled man.
To determine the equilibrium state, we need to explore the conditional payoff
expectations for each of the two locations for every type of person in the population, we have
four kinds of people, unskilled and skilled men and women. In the equilibrium state, no one has
anything to gain in expected payoff from migrating, given the location choices of everyone else.
Let plidenote the probability that a man in location i with wage j marries, and pi denote
the probability that a woman in location i marries, and p the probability that a woman marries a
man with wage j in location i.
A skilled man facing a choice between Urban and Rural will locate in Urban, as he can
obtain higher wages there, and always has a nonnegative probability of obtaining marriage, so
long as women are present. Unskilled men will not relocate, as unskilled jobs are available in
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both locations, and he is indifferent with regard to marriage versus bachelorhood. Remember that
his valuation of marriage was the same as his price.
Skilled women's payoff from locating in Urban is
= puzi, + pYi(zH zL) + wH, (1)
while her expected payoff from locating in Rural is
= pRzL + wL. (2)
The difference is that in Urban, she'll obtain higher wages, and have some probability of
marrying a richer man who will pay more for marriage. The payoff to unskilled women from
locating in Rural is the same as for skilled women (2), but her payoff from locating in urban is
= pu + - + vt,L. (3)
This is the same as for the skilled women, except for the wages she can obtain.
The equilibrium variables of interest are the sex ratios in Urban and Rural, MU1FU and
MR1FR. The final number of men in rural areas is MU = m +171411 in114,since all high skilled
men in Rural relocate to Urban, and neither unskilled men in Rural nor Urban have anything to
gain by migrating. Skilled women also stay in Urban, or relocate from Rural to Urban. However,
since MH> FH, this alone is not enough to establish a surplus of women in Urban. The migrants
of interest are thus unskilled women. These women face identical labor markets in both
locations; hence the marriage market must be what induces some of these women to move to
Urban. If there were fewer women than men in urban areas, as there would be if only skilled
women moved to Urban, women would marry with probability one in these areas. In addition,
they would have some positive probability of marrying a high wage man. The payoffs of Urban
and Rural thus cannot equalize unless there is a diminished chance of getting married in Urban.
From equation (2) and (3), we can establish that Urban is more attractive to unskilled
women than Rural so long as
PRzL,+ WL< PuzL + Pri(ZH ZL) WL,
which can be simplified to
pR_pU zH-ZL
PH ZL
(4)
Simply put, Urban is more attractive to unskilled women than Rural so long as the higher
possible payoff from marrying a wealthier man makes up for the reduced probability of marriage
in Urban for women in general.
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The right hand side of equation (4) is positive due to the fact that wealthier men pay more
for marriage, and the left hand side can be defined as
min{A, 1) —min{B, 1}
cP(8)
min{C, 1) (5)
where
R U u
A =
mR
B = MH+MH+ML n1 R
U
—  H+MH 

fLR
14+fiy+fLu +8 and C — ,
8 E [0,AR]is the number of unskilled women who migrate from Rural to Urban. So long as the
number of women is greater than men in Rural, A is the probability that a woman will get
married in Rural, and is increasing with 8, since the number of competing women decreases with
8. B is the probability of a woman getting married in Urban, so long as there are more women
than men. B is decreasing with 6, because the number of competing women per man increases. C
is the probability of a woman marrying a wealthy man in Urban, so long as the number of skilled
men in Urban is lower than the number of women, it too is decreasing with 6 because of
increased competition between women.
Let 8* denote the equilibrium set of values of 8 where the expected payoff from locating in
Urban or Rural is equal for unskilled women, meaning that (4) becomes an equality. Also let 6'
be the number of unskilled women who need to migrate to Urban for the sex ratios to balance.
Migration to urban is attractive until equation (4) no longer holds, so
= {
p R —p U
=
ZH — ZL}
6* (5. u 
PH zi.,
This establishes an equilibrium where 8 > 8' for all 6 c 8*,meaning that the equilibrium
number of unskilled women migrating from Rural to Urban is greater than that which equalizes
the sex ratios, and establishes an equilibrium where the women outnumber men in urban. The
reason for this is that 4)'(8) > 0, while the right hand side of equation (4) is positive, and
cl,(8') = 0.
In simpler terms, the equilibrium established in this model predicts that a higher number
of unskilled women will migrate to the cities than what is needed to balance the sex ratios
because the relative probability of marriage in rural versus urban areas for unskilled women is
increasing with the number of these women who migrate to urban areas. If only enough unskilled
women migrated to urban areas to balance the sex ratio, migrating to urban areas would still be
attractive to unskilled women because when the probabilities of marriage is equal in both areas,
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women prefer partners in high-paying jobs, who have a higher valuation of marriage. Thus the
equilibrium value is higher than the one which establishes a one-to-one balance between women
and men in urban and rural areas.
Other than the central prediction concerning the sex ratios in urban and rural areas,
Edlund points out four other implications from the model. Firstly, employment in the urban area
is both skilled and unskilled. Secondly, unskilled employment in the urban area is relatively
more female than unskilled employment in rural area. Third, all singles in the urban area are
female, while they are male in the rural area. Fourth, single women have higher earnings than
single males. The last point follows from the fact that men are indifferent with regard to
women's earnings when choosing a partner in this model, so some single females are skilled,
while all single males are unskilled.
Some of the starting assumptions of the model might seem to be somewhat strong, and
the predictions fairly simplistic. Simplifying assumption are necessary to create models which
yield clear prediction, and can give a good starting position for an analysis, or a way to explain
observed patterns. We should not expect the results of our analysis to yield patterns which are as
clear cut as the implications from this model, that doesn't subtract from its usefulness in
explaining why we see the sex ratio decrease with male earnings, as shown in tables 2 and 3 later
in the text.
Labor demand is hardly perfectly elastic, but over time, employers and entrepreneurs
generally find workable jobs for idle workers. Labor demand might therefor be said to be very
elastic in the long run. If migration takes place over a shorter time period, and labor demand is
somewhat inelastic, wage depression might predict a more muted result. On the other hand, the
model does not contain any time considerations, so the approach to the equilibrium with regard
to furnishing jobs for migrant workers might be something that takes place as the economy
develops. Another assumption which might seem strong is that men in skilled jobs pay more for
marriage than unskilled men. If the minimum price for marriage is set by unskilled men's highest
valuation, skilled men should have no incentive to pay women more than a small amount above
this price, especially when a surplus of women develops in urban areas. It's easy to see from a
real-world perspective why men might transfer more resources to women than the "bare
minimum" required to stay married, but harder to justify in the formal model. However, as long
as it can be justified with basis in reality, it makes sense as an assumption for modeling purposes.
The other assumptions break with reality to some degree, but make the model simpler
while still retaining some truth important to yield clear predictions. Obviously, jobs fall into
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more categories than two, but some jobs require specific skills, others do not. Similarly, some
employees have job specific skills, while others do not. Generally, employers prefer hiring
employees with relevant skills if they can. Even with the addition of different kinds of skills in
the model, or introduction of a more general distribution of skills in the populace, the central
prediction of the model would hold in that the available employment opportunities differ in the
same ways as the workforce with regard to the level of skills attained or required.
Furthermore, rural municipalities do have employment opportunities for high-skilled
workers. Almost any workplace which employs low-skilled workers needs some proportion of
skilled workers; both private and governmental workplaces employ high-skilled workers
throughout Norway. On the other hand, the relative share of jobs requiring specific educational
attainments, or highly developed skills with regard to some tasks relevant to employers is higher
in urban areas. If wages reflect the skill level needed to qualify for a position, more urban areas
having higher average wages might reflect the fact that a higher share of high-skill jobs are
located there. This connection between wages and women's migration to urban areas is the one
that is utilized in the analysis as a stand-in for job-related skill, as wages ideally reflect the
contribution of the employee to the employer. The population and centrality of the municipality
form controls to better isolate the effect of sex-specific wages on differential migration.
The Norwegian landscape is also more nuanced than an Urban-Rural dichotomy. One
might however make a case for a subdivision of Norwegian municipalities into degrees of
centrality, this has been done, and is part of the analysis. Statistics Norway has subdivided
Norwegian municipalities into categories dependent on the proximity to urban centers, creating
categories on the rural-urban dimension which are useful for isolating the earnings effects in our
analysis
Direct evidence on gender-specific migration
A large-scale natural experiment was observed in former East and West Germany after the fall of
the Berlin wall in 1989, and dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the years 1989 to 2007, nearly
ten percent of the population in former East Germany migrated to West Germany. The migrating
population was largely composed of young women, meaning that the number of women per man
in former the east decreased dramatically, down to 89 women per 100 men as a whole, and as
low as 80 in rural areas. Authors studying the characteristics of different regions in East
Germany, Kröhnert and Vollmer( 2012), found that the regions with the most outbound female
migration were those which had educational systems favorable to women, and whose job-
markets favored men. With the mechanization of agricultural and industrial labor, and the
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resulting decrease in demand for manual labor in these sectors, women were to a larger degree
than men pushed out of rural areas during the I9-hundreds, creating a stream of female migration
towards rural areas (Chant 1992). In Soviet East Germany, migration was severely restricted, and
when migration became possible, women left the east, particularly those women with higher
educational attainments who were located in areas where prospects for future careers were bleak.
Another panel-data study on female migration in Germany in this period found that westward
migrating women did not experience any statistically significant increase in earnings, but spent
more time on home production, such a childcare (Zaiceva 2010). Though there are complicating
factors, such as migrants' and women's lowered career prospects in general (Boyd 1984), this
indicates that women substituted some of their work for chores and part-time work when their
income increased, keeping their earnings relatively constant.
These findings offer support for our hypothesis that migration is prompted by marriage
possibilities and income prospects. It also indicates that marriage is a means of facilitating the
making of and caring for children, supported by wages and transfers from men to women. On the
other hand, it raises some issues with the income measure (gender and age-specific average
annual earnings) used to predict the effect of income on the sex ratio. As discussed later in the
text, earnings incorporate the substitution of leisure or home production for labor. Ideally we
would like to have other measures of income, such as hourly wages to better capture the
attractiveness of careers in different municipalities.
EMPIRICALANALYSIS
Testing the hypothesis
Migration is commonly considered to be a response to expectations of a change in opportunities
in response to push- or pu//-forces, indicating some difference in the opportunities and hopes of
each location. Such factor might be the possibility (or impossibility) of obtaining employment or
marriage in a location, creating an incentive for migration to wherever is most ideal. Migration
can also happen in response to a job offer, but searching for these might also be influenced by
pre-established wage expectations, which in turn depend on available employment opportunities.
If men and women behave similarly with regard to migration for employment purposes, but meet
differing prospects because of their skills and the labor in demand, we would expect women to
migrate to where their own expected earnings are highest, and that men should do the same.
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The central pattern to be explained by Edlund's model is that urban areas have a lower
sex ratio than rural areas. The reason this is the case, as explained by the model, is that rural and
urban areas differ in the kinds of jobs that are available there. Urban areas induce those with high
skill, both men and women, to relocate there, while rural offers only unskilled jobs. The location
choices of high-skilled males towards urban areas induce low-skilled women to relocate here as
well, beyond that level which balances the sex ratio, because the payoff from obtaining a high-
wage husband is enough to offset the lower probability of actually getting married up to a certain
point, dependent on the differences in what high and low-earning males transfer to women
throughout a marriage.
In her article, Edlund utilizes the preceding prediction to analyze the sex ratio in Sweden,
controlling for the same factors used in this analysis. The result she arrives at is a negative effect
of male earnings on the sex ratio, vindicating the usability of her model as an explanatory
framework. In the next sections, I duplicate Edlund's regression analysis on Norwegian data,
arriving at similar results for at least one subdivision of the population. There are some
differences in the data material, reflecting the different character of the countries. Firstly,
Sweden has a far larger number of inhabitants, approximately 9.4 million in 2011.7 The
population in Norway only recently surpassed five million.8 On the other hand, Norway is
divided into a larger number of municipalities, 430 to Sweden's 289, meaning there are fewer
inhabitants in each municipality. This might be a source of unexplained variation in an
investigation of the sex ratio, as smaller municipalities are more likely to have large deviations in
the sex ratio purely due to chance at birth. The next section of this thesis investigates whether
this variability is grater or smaller than expected, before moving on to what and how the relevant
explanatory variables affect the sex ratio through migration.
The following section (II) utilizes the predictions of Edlund's model on Norwegian data
in order to establish whether men's earnings really induce women to migrate from one place to
another. If our starting point is the hypothesis that women only take into consideration where
their own earnings prospects are highest, men's earnings in the municipality should not matter to
the number of women located in that municipality. If the sex ratio is a measure of the relative
numbers of men and women, women's earnings should have a negative effect on this measure
while men's earnings should have a positive effect. Our model however, predicts that men's
average earnings have a negative effect on sex ratio.
' http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart 2589 I .aspx
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/02/folkendrkv_en/2011k4/hitti100-en.html
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In a regression of the sex ratio of the following form, male earnings would enter into the
equation with a coefficient, a;
Number of men
= alog(average male income) + controls + E.
number of women
If the model's predictions are correct, a takes a negative value rather than a positive one.
Possible relevant controls are women's earnings, the centrality or population of the municipality,
whether it is an industrial municipality and so on. The reason population is included as a control
variable is to test whether the hypothesized mechanism inducing women to move to the cities
(men's income) is a pull-factor on its own, and not just an artifact of women moving to the cities,
where men's income happens to be higher.
Data overview and exploration
The following subsection investigates data collected (table 1) on variables for Norwegian
municipalities relevant to the study of the sex ratio and its determinants, and looks at correlations
which might be interesting to our hypothesis. Data and results from other studies are discussed as
well.
The unit of observation used to test the hypothesis is the municipality. All the variables
were gathered for the year 2008, due to availability. Choosing the municipality as the unit of
observation also allows for the easy collection of results, but introduces some complicating
factors. Ideally, one would like a unit of observation across whose boundaries no marriage
occurs without migration, and which forces cohabitation and work within the unit boundaries, in
order to better capture income effects on migration. As a rule, marriage markets are local
(Goldman, Westoff, and Hammerslough 1984), and most people meet potential mates and finally
marry someone from their local community or nearby community (Lampard 1997). However,
couples do form unions without necessary immediate migration captured by municipal records,
and work also happens across municipal borders. Municipalities might be too small to capture
the full picture in their records, or too large, concealing patterns which might be useful for
analysis. ln using total municipal numbers to compute sex ratio and average earnings numbers,
there is still hope that the larger patterns of migration for marriage and employment purposes are
captured.
Every non-dummy variable is separately generated for each of the age groups 25 to 34
and 35 to 44 years of age. The reason this age range is chosen rather than the population as a
whole is that the ages 25 to 44 are those of family formation and migration, the age in which
people make decisions about there to live and work. Census data on the Norwegian population
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Table I: Descriptive statistics (Data is on Norwegian municipalities for the year 2008)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Gender ratio, ages 25-34 1.06 0.14 0.66 2.60
Gender ratio, ages 35-44 1.06 0.10 0.74 2.07
Total population not aged 25-34 9708.818 26755.27 407 444276
Total population not aged 35-44 9484.368 27668.57 385 469722
Total municipal population 11165.82 32902.22 451 560484
*Share females not married (25-34) 0.60 0.10 0.28 0.90
*Share females not married (35-44) 0.32 0.09 0.10 0.61
*Avg. male earnings, ages 25-34 355.21 41.11 194.43 511.10
*Avg. male earnings, ages 35-44 425.48 57.82 266.27 679.58
*Avg. female earnings, ages 25-34 236.48 19.78 179.00 292.38
*Avg. female earnings, ages 35-44 283.06 26.99 216.59 410.74
Classifications of municipalities:



suburb 0.31 0.46 0 1
industrial 0.18 0.36 0 1
rural 0.34 0.47 0 I
military 0.08 0.27 0 1
central 0.04 0.19 0 1
Sources: Norwegian Social Science Data Services
(*)Courtesy of Erik Ø. Sørensen, aggregated from administrative records, as part of the NFR
VAM project in labor economics.
reveals that the year groups with the most within-country migration for unmarried men and
women are 20 to 24 and 25 to 29, while peak migration rates for married men and women is in
the age group 30 to 39•9 The younger age groups, those aged 20 to 24, are the most frequent
migrants. This is most likely because of migration for purposes of acquiring an education, or
entering into the work force, which mainly happens at this age. For the purposes of this study,
which investigates the sex ratio with marriage as a possible key for determining migration, data
is collected on the population from 25 years because the age at first marriage in Norway was on
average 28.9 years for women, and 31.6 years for men in 1999.10Noting the differences in age at
first marriage, creating separate age categories for men and women by staggering the age
categories could be justifiable in a study of the marriage market, because it allows us to better
capture the sex ratio for the separate age groups most likely to form couples. For example, the
sex ratio could be calculated as the number of men aged 25 to 29 divided by the number of
women aged 23 to 27 (Guttentag and Secord 1983). However, significant variation around the
9 Statistics Norway, Befolkningsstatistikk. Innenlandske flyttinger, 2011, table 10:
htt ://ssb.no/f1 tin /tab-2012-05-11-10.html
Statistics Norway, Samfunnsspeilet nr. 1, 2002, «Inngåtte ekteskap: "Halve Norge" har sagt ja»:
htt ://www.ssb.no/ss /ut /200201/05/
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mean difference in age makes narrow boundaries of ages unadvisable because significant
competition for mates occurs across age groups, and staggering of a few years in larger age
groups might make the procedure unnecessarily complicated (Fossett and Kiecolt 1991).
Subdividing the sampled population into two age groups of ten years allows us to look at which
differences exist between the two while maintaining the simplicity of the basic measure, it also
allows direct comparison to the results found by Edlund (2005).
As mentioned, the sex ratio is chosen as the variable of interest to easily understand what
is being studied, and to allow comparison with Edlund's study. There is, however, one
complicating factor with looking at the distribution of genders as a relative number of either
gender. For instance, with a 70-30-split in men and women as percentages of the population, the
gender ratio becomes 2.33, a 1.33 difference from the normal (50/50) split. If the split was the
reverse, 30 and70 percent men and women, the gender ratio would be 0.43, only 0.57 from the
normal 1.0, less than half the deviation when the sample of genders were 70-30. This means that
when looking at a variable with potentially large deviations from unity, such as in the smaller
municipalities, outliers will look much larger when deviation is in one of these directions,
potentially giving us results which could be better understood if another measure was used. This
concern is especially valid when looking at the effect of municipal size on the sex ratio. When
analyzing how binomial variability might result in deviations from the predicted sex ratio,
comparing smaller and larger municipalities, the number of women in an age group as a fraction
of total population in that age group will be used instead of the sex ratio. This is done both
because it is easier mathematically, and because it allows us to see a picture where the largest
(and most likely to be the results of coincidences) upward deviations of the sex ratio are brought
within the same bounds as downward deviations. Deviations in either direction thus have
identical effects.
The sex ratio and municipal population
An important fact about Norwegian municipalities is the large amount of variation present across
almost all included dimensions. The number of inhabitants in the municipalities varies a lot, from
a low of 218 in Utsira, to well over 600.000 in Oslo at present date. While most of Norway's
municipalities have less than 10.000 inhabitants, a significant share of the Norwegian population
is located in the largest cities.
Due to the large amount of variation in population numbers, the number of women in
each age group is then naturally highly variable as well. The minimum number of women
between 25 and 34 in a single municipality is 16, while the highest number of the women of this
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age group in one municipality is over 58 thousand in Oslo. Logarithmic numbers of population
are used throughout the analysis, allowing the study of relative effects of population differences,
rather than absolute differences.
The sex ratio is conventionally calculated as the number of males per female. The data
used to calculate these variables is collected from Norwegian Social Science Data Services
(NSD). This is also the source of the population measures and the municipal typologies used to
create the dummy variables central, rural and suburb.
A first glance at the sex ratio shows that it has an average value close to expectation of
1.06 in the collective age group 25 to 44, and that it is quite variable with a standard deviation of
0.14 and 0.11 for the younger and older age groups, respectively.
Considering the large variability in the sex ratio in the smaller municipalities, it might be
useful to know if the large variation we see in the sex ratios (see Figure 3) in small
municipalities versus the large ones is due to some effect other than their sample size. 1n a
binomial distribution such as the sex categories of the population, we expect to see a larger
variance in the sex ratio in smaller municipalities than in larger ones, as these have a smaller
sample size of the general populace. With a sample of hundreds of thousands, such as in Oslo, a
deviation of a few percent can be highly unlikely if assumed to be purely by chance, while a
similar deviation from the general mean might be common in smaller municipalities.
Gender ratio vs. population
Ages 25 to 34 Ages 35 to 44
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Figure 3, Sex ratios and population numbers in Norwegian municipalities.
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In order to study whether the sex ratios vary as expected with the municipal sizes, we use
the fraction the population that is female, instead of the sex ratio. This means that a sex ratio of
one yields a fraction equal to one half, and a sex ratio of two means a fraction of approximately
thirty-three percent. Regressing the fraction of women on the logarithmic population numbers for
each age group yields a prediction of the female fraction (p) which is linear with regards to the
logarithmic population numbers, and is increasing from approximately 47.5% in the smallest
municipalities, and increases to a little more than half in the largest ones for the younger group,
and slightly less for the elder. More precisely, the robust regression yields the relation p =
0.454 + 0.00504 * log(population) for the age group 25 to 34, and p = 0.463 + 0.00345 *
log(population) for the age group 35 to 44 with a high degree of significance. This is in line
with our earlier observations of the lower sex ratio (larger female fraction) in larger
municipalities.
The variance of a binomial distribution is directly proportional to its sample size, the
population numbers in each municipality, and is dependent on the expected fraction of each sex
by the rule
var(number of women) = population * (1— p) * p
where p is the probability of `success', or the chance that an observation is a woman. The
expected variance in the fraction of the population of either sex, however, is equal to the
variance of the sample mean, which is inversely proportional to the square root of the sample
size,
c
population
umber of women 1
var(femalefraction) = var = var(number of women)(population2).
Taking the square root yields a prediction of the expected standard deviation of the
fraction samples dependent on the municipality size. If the fractions are binomially determined,
we should be seeing approximately 68.2 percent of the points falling within on standard
deviation, the grey areas in Figure 4, for any interval of municipal population.
The actual deviation is the difference between the fraction of women in the municipality and the
predicted fraction. Adjusting the actual deviation by subtracting the predicted standard deviation,
and adjust for population-dependent expected difference (thus also the relative difference in
empirical and expected deviance) by multiplying each point by square root of the municipal
population, gives us a distribution of relative deviations (actual versus predicted) of the fraction
which should have an expectation of zero, and be invariant with municipal size.
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Expected and predicted deviation of gender fractions
Ages 25-34 Ages 35-44
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Figure 4, Predicted range and actual distribution of the municipal female fractions.
Regressing this variable on logarithmic municipal population in each age group reveals that the
variance in the female fraction is increasing with municipal size. On the other hand, Student t-
tests on the alternative hypothesis that the mean of the adjusted deviations are different from zero
offer no rejections. The reason for the increasing variability when adjusted for municipal size, it
might be that small municipalities with skewed sex ratios have more of a pull-effect on the
scarce sex than large ones, or an incentive for the plentiful sex to leave because of the lack of
available partners. One reason this effect might be less apparent in larger municipalities could be
that the absolute number of single partners is great enough to afford the possibility of finding a
partner even if the sex ratio is skewed.
To control for population effects on the sex ratio, a measure of the population which
excludes the age group we are studying is included in the final subsection of the empirical
analysis. This allows correcting for the size of the municipality and its effect on the sex ratio
while avoiding bringing the dependent variable into the control variable in any way. One of the
effects we're trying to capture with the inclusion of the population measure is the possibility that
men and women attach different weights to the importance of services and amenities more
readily available in more populous municipalities, such as museums and cultural activities, a
wider variety of goods and services, and so on. This might have an impact on the sex ratio
through differential migration.
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Men 's and women's earnings
Arguably the most important determinant of migration is employment; I use earnings data to
control for women's differing income prospects in the municipalities, so as to better isolate the
effect of men's income. For a total of 6 municipalities, the population is so sparse that they are
not included in the final dataset due to small sample sizes, this leaves 424 municipalities.
Women and men's earnings shows the arithmetic mean of annual earnings in number of
thousands NOK in a year for the age and sex groups and can be seen in Figure 5 as a scatterplot
of female versus male earnings. When testing whether males' earnings have a significant
negative effect on the sex ratio, one of the most important control variables is the earnings
available to women themselves, it would be reasonable to believe that these variables are highly
correlated as well.
In fact however, the data on average earnings for men and women in the younger group is
hardly correlated at all (0.08), but follows each other more closely in the older age group (0.44).
This might indicate that female earnings corrects more strongly for male earnings in the older
age group when including both in a test of the sex ratio on male earnings and controls, looking at
the results from the regressions in Table 2 and Table 3 reveals that this is the case, The
coefficient on logarithmic male earnings is adjusted downward from -0.185 to -0.133 for the
older age groups after female income is introduced, but only decreases from -0.132 to -0.126 for
Female earnings vs. Male earnings
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Figure 5, Average male and female earnings in Norwegian municipalities.
31
the younger. Female earnings are clearly lower on the whole than male earnings; this is both due
to varying wage levels and differences in labor force participation. This is as predicted by the
model proposed by Siow (1998) where men have more of an incentive than women to work and
accumulate human capital, to better compete for the favor of scarce women. Average earnings
for males as a whole also increases more with age than it does for women, as can be seen from
the differences in means for men and women of the two age groups in Table 1. Another
interesting fact is the higher degree of variation in men's earnings in the older age group,
indicating that the male earnings might be similar to women's in careers they have in common,
but higher in some sectors with predominantly male Employees.
Ideally, one would like to have data on wage levels instead of earnings, as participants
might choose to take more time off when moving to a municipality where higher wages are
offered, lowering earnings by substitution. Earnings is thus an imperfect substitute for the
measure of to what degree differential migration is caused by the wage prospects faced by men
and women, which is an uncontroversial driver of migration. Female earnings might also decline
as women chose to stay more at home if the husband's earnings are high.
Men 's earnings and women's marriage decisions
If men's earnings have no effect on women's decisions regarding marriage, we would expect to
see no particular relationship between the share of unmarried women and men's earnings. The
Fraction never-married is the share of women who are neither married nor divorced of the
populations in each age group and municipality. If we are to establish whether males' earnings
have some effect on female migration, and that the hypothesized mechanism of action is
transfers that take place within the marriage, we would expect a higher share of never-married
females in both age groups in municipalities where male annual earnings are low. Indeed, it
seems as if women are more reluctant to marry if the males' earnings are low, as can be seen by
the downward movement of the fraction of females who've never married as the average income
among men increases in Figure 6. This is even more interesting for our hypothesized effect as
we further investigate the fact that the average number of eligible men per woman is higher in
the municipalities where male earnings are lower. If women in low-earning municipalities have
more men to choose from, why doesn't a higher share of these women get married? If the
preceding theoretical exposition is to be believed, it is because they'd rather marry a man with a
higher income, possibly migrating to another municipality to do so. One possible objection is
that men's earnings in less populous municipalities are lower, and that we're rather seeing the
effect of a lower absolute number of available men. There is also a correlation between the share
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Share of females never married vs. Male earnings
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Figure 6, Men's earnings and shares of never-married women.
of unmarried women and the size of the municipality; this is another reason the population
variable is included in the regression. We can also see from the data on the Norwegian
municipalities that that the fraction of men that have never married in both age groups is
relatively high compared to the women, giving support to the observations about remarriage rates
for the sexes. If men are more likely to get married after a divorce than women, the number of
men who go unmarried must be higher than the number of women who go unmarried.
Other control variables
The dummy variables central and suburb (table 1) are generated for the purposes of this thesis;
the subdivisions are based on a municipal typology defined by Statistics Norway as the most
central municipalities. Those counted as central municipalities have a value of 1 if the
municipality has a population of 50.000 or more, while suburb has a value of 1 if it has less than
50.000 inhabitants, but is close by a central municipality. These variables are included to correct
for any effects that might affect the sex ratio due to the centrality of these municipalities, other
than the population effect.
The dummy variable included to correct for employment effects on sex in industrial
municipalities takes a value of 1 if the municipality is defined as a municipality primarily
occupied with industrial production according to the SSB Section for population statistics'
classification of municipalities (1994). The workforce in the industrial sector is primarily male,
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outnumbering women roughly 3 to 1,11which might mean that municipalities with relatively
large industrial workforces have a larger fraction of male inhabitants.
Comparing average numbers for industrial and nonindustrial municipalities, we find that
their sex ratios when looking at the entire population between 25 and 44 are approximately 1.10
and 1.05, respectively. Interestingly, men's earnings are higher in industrial than in nonindustrial
municipalities on average, while the opposite is true for women.
The rural dummy variable simply takes a value of 1 if it is classified as a least-central
municipality according to the municipal typologies defined by Statistics Norway, meaning that
they don't fulfill requirements for travel time to more central municipalities. A noted migration
pattern is the tendency for young women in rural areas to leave to more central areas, while men
stay at home. The rural dummy variable is included in an attempt to control for such effects; as
they might be unique to particularly rural areas. It might also control for sex dependent
employment opportunities in a similar way to the industrial dummy, as rural communities
generally have a larger agricultural sector. Agricultural work has traditionally been a male
dominated part of the economy.
Controlling for the presence of bases present in the municipality might isolate some
effects these bases might have of the sex ratio. Military encampments are predominantly male;
including a dummy variable to control for this might help isolate relationships between the
variables of interest. This variable is included to allow comparison to Edlund (2005). Even
though employment in such bases is predominantly male, most recruits do not change their
location in the national population register to these bases for the duration of their stay. However,
for the age group analyzed in this text, ages 25 to 44, the presence of enrolled reruits is less
relevant.
Regression results
I proceed in the following section to analyze the municipal data in a regression of the sex ratio on
male income, including various controls. Table 2 shows the coefficients resulting from 10
different ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) on the municipal data for the age groups 25-
34. Table 3 presents the results form an identical procedure on the age group 35-44.
11Regjeringen.no; NOU 2008 6:Kjønn og lønn, 3.3.1 Horisontal segregering:
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/b1d/dok/nouer/2008/nou-2008-6/4.html?id-501098
34
Regressions 1-5 in both regression tables omit female earnings as an independent
variable, which is included in regressions 6-10. Each group of regressions introduces the dummy
variables suburb, industrial, rural, military and central progressively through regressions
numbered 1-5 and 6-10.
For both age groups the male earnings variable enters with the hypothesized negative
sign throughout. This variable takes a coefficient value in regression (10) of -0.126 and -0.133
for the younger and older age groups, respectively, indicating that women have a tendency to
migrate to areas where men's earnings are higher. This means that if young (old) men's earnings
in a municipality increases by one standard deviation, 41 110 (57 820), then the sex ratio can be
expected to fall by 0.0138 (0.0169). If men and women behaved the same with regard to
migration and earnings, we would expect male earnings to predict a higher share of men, what
we see is quite the opposite. Both male and female earnings have negative coefficients in all
regression specifications, meaning women move to where average earnings is higher both for
themselves and for men, even when corrected for population numbers and the nature of
employment opportunities such as the industrial dummy, and possibly the central and suburb
dummies.
The coefficient on the population numbers, measured as number of inhabitants minus the
age groups measured in the sex ratio, is negative. This indicates that women have a preference
for municipalities with higher population numbers. This might also be true for men, but the
gender ratio is declining with population numbers even when controlled for income of either
gender. Using total population numbers or the number of women in each municipality as
population measures yields practically identical results in all regression specifications, except for
the size of the coefficients. The relationship between the sex ratio and the population is the
relation we briefly discussed in the previous section, declining sex ratio with population, but with
much higher variance in smaller municipalities. The declining variation in the gender ratio with
increasing population numbers is corrected for by reporting robust standard errors.
When female earnings are included in regressions 6-10 in tables 2 and 3 as an
independent variable, some further differences between the age groups appear. The coefficient
for female earnings is statistically significant for both groups, and enters with a large negative
coefficient. In the final regression (10), where all the independent variables are included, the
female earnings coefficient has a value of -0.234 and -0.283 for the younger and older age
groups, meaning a 10% increase in average female earnings would predict a change in the sex
ratio of approximately -0.02 and -0.026. The higher significance and larger value of the
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Table 3: Regression analysis, dependent variable: municipality sex ratio ages 25-34 (OLS)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(male earnings; 25-34) -0.066 -0.123 -0.126 -0.129 -0.132 -0.065 -0.117 -0.119 -0.123 -0.126


(0.067) (0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.067) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
log(female earnings; 25-34)




-0.281** -0.234** -0.223** -0.230** -0.234**




(0.119) (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103)
log(population not aged 25-34) -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.016** -0.016** -0.018** -0.020** -0.024**


(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
suburb -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.033** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.034** -0.029**


(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
industrial


0.079*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.079***


0.072*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.073***


(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)


(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
rural


-0.020 -0.021 -0.020


-0.011 -0.012 -0.011



(0.021) (0.022) (0.021)


(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
military



0.019 0.017



0.025 0.023



(0.016) (0.015)



(0.017) (0.016)
central



0.047*



0.052**




(0.026)



(0.026)
Observations 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.095 0.082 0.110 0.109 0.109 0.109
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significantat 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table 4: Regression analysis, dependent variable: municipality sex ratio ages 35-44 (OLS)
VARIABLES
log(male earnings; 35-44)
log(female earnings; 35-44)
log(population not aged 35-44)
suburb
industrial
rural
mil itary
central
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
-0.139* -0.178** -0.180** -0.182** -0.185** -0.084 -0.127* -0.129* -0.130* -0.133*
(0.075) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.063) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)




-0.322*** -0.276*** -0.269*** -0.280*** -0.283***




(0.118) (0.105) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105)
-0.017** -0.014* -0.017** -0.019** -0.022** -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 -0.014
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
-0.029*** -0.030*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.031** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.033**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)


0.080*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.080***


0.071*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.072***


(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)


(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)


-0.019 -0.020 -0.019


-0.013 -0.014 -0.013


(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)


(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)



0.018 0.016



0.029 0.027



(0.016) (0.016)



(0.018) (0.018)



0.049*



0.053**



(0.025)



(0.027)
424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424
0.068 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.099 0.128 0.127 0.127 0.128
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *SignifIcant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
coefficient for the older age groups might mean that female earnings are a stronger determinant
of migration for older women than young. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the female
earnings coefficient is approximately twice as large as the one for male earnings. We also need
to keep in mind that men migrate too, and that they presumably migrate to areas where their own
expected earnings is higher, any negative coefficient we see on male income should therefore be
thought of as negative despite the fact that men also migrate to where they can achieve higher
earnings.
The dummy variables correcting for centrality, suburbs and predominant industrial
sectors show significant effects of the gender ratio, the coefficients on the other dummy variables
are not significant, but they do modestly affect the scale and significance of the first three central
variables, male earnings, female earnings and female population.
The coefficient on the independent industrial dummy is statistically significant at the 1%
level in all regressions where it is included and has a positive value between 0.07 and 0.08. It
looks as if the employment opportunities present do affect the sex ratio, and to a fairly large
extent.
While the coefficients for industrial and military are positive, curiously, central is
positive, and rural is negative, opposite what one might expect from the anecdotal evidence of
women leaving the countryside to go to the cities, while men stay behind. This might indicate
that the more important factors of population and earnings measures drive the migration rather
than affinities for cities in themselves. Note that the central and rural dummies follow directly
from population measures, and earnings are significantly higher in highly populous
municipalities.
(IID DISCUSSION
Edlund (2005) found a large and statistically significant outcome on the male earnings'
coefficient in her identical procedure on Swedish data. For the young group, the male income
coefficient was around -0.2, for the elder it was around -0.14. The preceding regressions in this
text on Norwegian data also found a negative effect on sex ratio from men's earnings.
Approximately -0.12 for the younger group, and a larger and statistically significant outcome on
the older group of around -0.13. In the final regression (10), the coefficients for the logarithmic
male earnings variable were -0.126 and -0.133 for the younger and older age group, respectively.
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The coefficients were not significant after adjusting standard errors for heteroscedasticity in the
younger age group. On the whole however, it seems like the results I have arrived at are the same
found by Edlund, a negative effect on the sex ratio by male income, when controlled for female
earnings, municipal population etc.
The regression analysis shows us that the effect on the sex ratio of the population and
female earnings measures were statistically significant in the regressions for the younger groups,
the two earnings measures were significant for the elder age group. This might indicate a
difference in the migration pattern between younger and older women if we are to strictly ignore
results not adhering to the traditional 5% significance level. While young women move
according to their own employment opportunities and towards more populated areas, older and
more frequently attached women move according to the employment opportunities of both
themselves and the partner, irrespective of the population of the location. This might be in line
with what we expect of people in different period of their lives. We might expect young women
to place greater weight on finding employment relevant and financially rewarding in a period of
their lives where determining one's career path is central, and to aspire towards a life in the city.
While the ages 25-44 are the prime age of family formation, the act of migration is a more
frequent occurrence in this timespan. While migration might be affected by the possibility of
finding a suitable partner, it's reasonable to expect migration to be caused by a change in
occupation for oneself or one's partner. A change in occupation is also often accompanied by an
increase in earnings, especially early in a career. Older women might be expected to have
achieved some satisfaction in their career path, to have found jobs that suit their preferences, and
to be more amenable to moving in as a pair with their partner. They are also more frequently
attached, as we could see from the fraction women who were never married in the two age
groups. In the older age groups, the share who's never been married is 0.32, with young women,
it's 0.6.
Despite the lack of strictly significant results in parts of our test in a statistical sense, the
pattern as a whole is toward a rejection of the null hypothesis of a positive sign on the male
earnings coefficient. Remembering the correlation between the fraction of females who had
never married and the male earnings strengthens our belief in the hypothesized mechanism of
action, namely women moving to areas where men earn more, looking for marriage
opportunities.
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At least one important variable is not corrected for in this regression analysis, and that is
the general price level in the individual municipalities. For instance, in high-earning and more
populous municipalities, one expects prices to be higher. Migration might be significantly
impeded by higher prices of such goods as housing and other necessities. One often quoted
reason not to live in the cities is the high cost of living in general, and high real-estate prices in
particular. By not including this variable in the regression, it is reasonable to believe that the
earning variables' coefficients are lower than they would be if they were included, as prices and
earnings are typically positively correlated, and price considerations might impede migration. If
a clear pattern in the coefficients of an income measure is found, however, it is reasonable to
believe that this at least has the right sign, since any price variable showing variation between
municipalities is the result of differing wages in those municipalities, not the other way around.
Though there may be some complicating factors, leaving prices out of the equation leaves us
with a more muted result on the income variable, so any pattern that is actually observed should
still be taken seriously. Furthermore, because variables correcting for centrality and the rural
nature of municipalities are included, it is reasonable to expect that whatever price differences
exist between these areas are corrected for. At least with regards to the cost of real estate, these
variables should be expected to pick up some of the price effects that might influence the
migration of men or women.
In discussing Edlund's model we identified a pattern, a lower sex ratio in urban areas
than in rural areas. We also identified a potential mechanism to explain this phenomenon, the
migration of unskilled women prompted by the higher transfers in marriage from wealthier men,
who are more plentiful in urban areas. The discussion of theory in section (I) also elaborated and
justified this view by explaining the ways in which women's scarcity due to differential
fecundity, together with differential investment in children laid the basis for transaction from
men to women in the marriage framework. The regressions found an overall negative effect of
men's income on the sex ratio, indicating that women move to where men's income is higher
more than men do. Does this mean that the migration single unskilled women are the main
reason this pattern can be found? Perhaps women's relative abundance in urban areas are
holdovers from their higher participation in higher education, which mainly takes place in urban
areas where men's income is higher. The most interesting group for a study of the sex ratio (with
an eye towards marriage), those aged 25- 34, showed no statistically significant coefficients on
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male earnings. Because this is the age group at which most marriages take place, we would
expect this variable to have a highly significant coefficient if the model that was explained in
section (II) should be believed. The fact that we found such a pattern in the older age group and
not the younger, may point towards another explanation.
In the model developed by Edlund, all migrants were unmarried, and only took into
consideration their own income and potential transfers from men. As table I reveals, 60 percent
of all women aged 35 to 44 were married or previously married. It is reasonable to expect that
many migrate as couples. As young men and women migrate, they do so towards wherever they
can achieve higher earnings. When sufficiently stable and rewarding employment is found, men
and women find partners, marry, and have children. As a couple ages, they are likely to migrate
again, but they now make decisions as a couple. When evaluating where to live, work, and bring
up children, couples are take less heed of the size of the municipalities, but rather the combined
income they can achieve wherever they migrate. As married women are more likely to be
working part-time, and have lower earnings than men, men's expected income is most likely the
deciding factor. The migration of couples decreases any deviation from unity of the sex ratio
wherever they migrate to, and increases it in the municipality they left, if they migrate to and
from the same place.
If a man and a woman move to the same location without previously living in the same
municipality, the migrating spouse is the "tied mover", while the other is a "tied stayer" as
coined by Robert Frank (1978). Frank attempted to explain women's relatively low wages by
examining the way couples migrate and search for employment. As men are traditionally the
breadwinner in a family or a couple, they are more often the tied stayer, and the employment of
women is the secondary concern (Mincer 1977). This leads women to search for jobs in a
suboptimal location, more often becoming overeducated compared to her position, while men are
more often undereducated. This pattern has been confirmed in a study of Swedish men and
women (Katz and Johansson 2007).
Because women in the age groups 35 to 44 are more frequently part of a couple, they
migrate more often in response to concrete earnings differences between municipalities affecting
the family while migrating as a unit, rather than as a result of a probability of obtaining higher
transfers though marriage with a potential husband. If one party is a tied mover, the pattern seen
with a relatively strong effect from men's earnings on the sex ratio in this group can be explained
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by women's decision to migrate to where the man lives, especially is that man is a high earner.
Men in high-earning municipalities are also more likely to be married, whether this is because
they are better able to attract women willing to marry from other locations, or because provide
more desirable marriage markets for women, women will be more plentiful in such locations. If
these men are tied stayers, their high earnings could explain the negative coefficient on the male
earnings coefficient in the regression analysis in table 3.
(IV) CONCLUSION
Much of the variation in the sex ratio between municipalities can be explained by chance, as
shown when discussing how the sex ratio varies with municipal population in section (II). Of the
total variation in the sex ratio, only a little more than ten percent was predictable using men's
and women's earnings, population numbers, regional identifiers and economic variables. It is
reasonable to expect that including more variables detailing differences between the labor
markets of municipalities would help explain some of the remaining variation in the sex ratio,
but most of the differences between municipalities are likely to remain, because the variation
cannot be shown to be greater nor smaller than that which is expected by pure chance. One way
the data could be modified to eliminate some of the random variation would be grouping small,
adjacent municipalities.
Edlund (2005), "Sex and the City", hypothesizes that the relatively high number of
women in urban areas compared to rural areas is based on transactions from men to women in
exchange for marriage. Wealthier men can afford larger transaction, and women are willing to
migrate to the urban areas where these men are located even though their chances of getting
married are diminished. Urban areas can sustain larger populations of women, because
transaction in exchange for marriage is an additional source of income for these women. This
thesis finds theoretical justification for Edlund's hypothesized mechanism of action, men's
earnings constituting a pull-factor on women. The theoretical basis of this hypothesized relation
between the sex ratio and men's earnings are women's scarcity, the importance of differential
investment, and marriage as a framework for transactions between men and women. These
concepts are justified both theoretically and with reference to earlier studies in section (I), with
some important objections. For instance, it is harder to assert that women are less skilled than
men when women take more higher education than men on average.
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The hypothesized connection between marriage and earnings is strengthened further by
the clear fact that for both age groups, women are less likely to be married or previously married
if the average earnings among males in the municipality are low, despite the fact that more men
are available per woman in these municipalities. If migration can be assumed to happen in
response to opportunities in the marriage market, and the marriage opportunities are perceived as
worse in municipalities with poorer men, low male earnings should induce the outward migration
of women. There should exist a negative relationship between the sex ratio and male earnings if
our hypothesis, as replicated from Edlund (2005), is correct
The sex ratio in Norwegian municipalities measured as the number of men per woman, in
the population aged 25 to 44, is decreasing with municipal population. This confirms the pattern
seen in many countries of lower sex ratios in urban areas compared to rural areas. For the age
group 25 to 34, women's earnings also predicts a lower gender ratio. A similar but smaller
negative effect on the sex ratio is also seen in men's earnings, though this effect is statistically
speaking inconclusive. However, because both men and women migrate, the fact that the gender
ratio is not increasing with male earnings might indicate that women migrate with an eye
towards the financial situation of potential husbands. In the age group 35 to 44, both men's and
women's earnings predict a lower sex ratio; the municipal population has no effect on the sex
ratio of this group when controlled for these variables. This is evidence in support of our model,
but can also be an indication that older women migrate in response to their partner's potential
earnings, as older women are more frequently part of a couple.
The results arrived at in this text are less clear-cut than the ones found by Edlund (2005),
but still confirm the pattern as a whole. Women are relatively more plentiful in more populous
municipalities than men, women are also relatively more plentiful where earnings are higher, not
just their own, but men's earnings as well. If variations in earnings indicate some real difference
in job-related skills held in varying degree by men and women, the results verify that the model
developed by Edlund might capture a kernel of truth to explain the differences in migration
patterns among men and women. Women do to some degree take men's income into account,
most certainly when deciding whether or not to get married, and also when making decisions
about where to live. Because men with higher income are relatively more plentiful in populous
municipalities, this provides an incentive for the urbanization of women beyond that which can
be explained simply by a preference for cities or the pull of higher wages.
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